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Ordinariness as Equality*
ELISE C. BODDIE†
INTRODUCTION
This Essay argues for an equality norm of racial ordinariness. Ordinariness here
refers to the state of being treated as a full, complex person and a rightful recipient
of human concern.1 As a norm, its purpose is to focus constitutional attention on
common, everyday interactions as sources of racial indignity.2 It also seeks to sensitize courts and other constitutional actors to the infinite varieties and grittier dimensions of discrimination through the “understandings of everyday folk.”3
It may seem odd to think of ordinariness as a matter of racial equality. But
consider the following speech by Frederick Douglass in 1865.4 Asked “what to do
with the negro,” Douglass responded in part as follows:
All I ask is, give him a chance to stand on his own legs! Let him alone!
If you see him on his way to school, let him alone,—don’t disturb him!
If you see him going to the dinner table at a hotel, let him go! If you see
him going to the ballot box, let him alone!—don’t disturb him! If you see
him going into a workshop, just let him alone,—your interference is
doing him positive injury.5
Douglass’s plea reveals the vastness of discrimination and how it seeped through the
crevices of everyday life.6 His request for freedom in the everyday—to be able to go
to school, dine, vote, work, just to be—spoke to a desire to live as an ordinary person,

* Copyright © 2018 Elise C. Boddie.
† Professor of Law, Henry Rutgers University Professor, and Judge Robert L. Carter
Scholar, Rutgers Law School. I am grateful to Robin Lenhardt for her comments on an earlier
draft. I also thank Jacy Rush and the staff of the Law Review for their assistance.
1. This definition is analogous to what Iris Marion Young has described as two general
values of the “good life”: “participating in determining one’s action and the conditions of one’s
action” and “developing and exercising one’s capacities and expressing one’s experience.”
IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 37 (1990). Ordinariness is also
similar to what Kenneth Karst has described as a right of belonging and “to be treated by
organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.” Kenneth Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1977).
2. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 809 (2004).
3. Charles Jones, Why Not Freedom?, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1068 (1999).
4. See Ronald Turner, The Too-Many-Minorities and Racegoating Dynamics of the AntiAffirmative-Action Position: From Bakke to Grutter and Beyond, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
445, 481 (2003).
5. Id. at 481 & n.175 (quoting Frederick Douglass, What the Black Man Wants: An
Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts (Jan. 26, 1865), in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS
PAPERS 59, 68 (John W. Blasingame & John R. McKivigan eds., 1991)). Turner writes that
“Douglass was criticizing a contract-labor system established and enforced by the general in
Louisiana in which freed slaves were forced to work on plantations.” Id. at 481 n.175.
6. Cf. Jones, supra note 3, at 1069.
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unencumbered by racial stigma and by the status of subordination and “otherness”
that engulfed black people.
This Essay embraces the same demand for ordinariness that Frederick Douglass
expressed over a century and a half ago. Its primary concern is the lived experiences
of race for black people and the quiet trauma that comes from being the persistent
object of societal fear7 and resentment.8 To be denied ordinariness is to be shrouded
in stereotypes and assumptions in an abstracted identity that is never fully one’s
own.9 These experiences can take the form of subtler indignities that erode the self.
In the extreme, they can be life altering or lead to death.10
As I have indicated, ordinariness as a measure of equality is not a new concept.
This Essay’s goal is to surface some of what has been said about it already in constitutional discourse, but has never been fully heard. For instance, by its terms, Brown
v. Board of Education11 declared unconstitutional segregation in public education.12
But it was understood and celebrated by blacks at the time for its promise of ordinariness13 and the hope that the decision would bring freedom from the daily encumbrances and stigma of race. In the years after Brown, some civil rights litigants took
up this claim more directly and framed their demands for equality explicitly through
the lens of ordinariness.14 The idea of ordinariness as a form of equality also surfaced

7. See JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 81–101 (1997); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF
CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND
OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 1–13 (1998).
8. See generally Steven A. Tuch & Michael Hughes, Whites’ Racial Policy Attitudes in
the Twenty-First Century: The Continuing Significance of Racial Resentment, 634 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 134 (2011) (discussing the persistence of white racial resentment
against African Americans). Kenneth Karst makes a similar point about the complexity of
white resentment, suggesting that such resentment is grounded in shame and guilt over blacks’
historical subjugation and mistreatment. Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L.
REV. 245, 268 (1983) (“About twenty years ago, in casual conversation, my friend Vaughn
Ball put this idea in words I shall never forget: ‘You can always forgive people for what they
do to you, but you can never forgive them for what you do to them.’”).
9. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 809.
10. See infra Part I.
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
12. See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1334 (2004) (“Brown sought to
eliminate segregation in schools and thereby ensure that educational opportunity would not be
rationed according to race.”).
13. I heard Brown described this way by those who lived through the era of state-enforced
segregation at a celebration of the decision’s sixtieth anniversary. LDF Commemorates 60th
Anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC. (May
16, 2014), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/naacp-legal-defense-fund-commemorates60th-anniversary-brown-v-board-education [https://perma.cc/N4ES-Q2DG]; see also
Maksymilian Del Mar, Exemplarity and Narrativity in the Common Law Tradition, 25 LAW
& LITERATURE 390, 396 (2013) (“[O]rdinariness . . . [is] what a black kid ought to expect on
arriving at a school door in Little Rock, Arkansas, after Brown v. Board of Education struck
down racial segregation.” (quoting JEROME BRUNER, MAKING STORIES: LAW, LITERATURE,
LIFE 5–6 (2002))).
14. See infra Part II.

2018]

ORD INAR INESS AS EQUA LIT Y

59

more obliquely in a smattering of constitutional cases from the 1970s and 1980s,
principally in dissents by Justice Marshall.15 From there the trail disappears in race
cases, though it has emerged more recently in Justice Kennedy’s opinions in
Obergefell v. Hodges16 and Romer v. Evans,17 finding for plaintiffs challenging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
Part I explains why ordinariness matters and the importance of everyday interactions to achieving ordinariness. It discusses these points through the lens of a true
story about the shooting death of a black man by the police.18 Part II discusses court
opinions that have identified ordinariness, either explicitly or implicitly, as a form of
equality. Part III discusses the Fourth Amendment as one example of how constitutional doctrine denies ordinariness. The Essay closes with a brief discussion of the
challenges and possibilities of ordinariness as a constitutional norm.
I. WHY ORDINARINESS MATTERS
Consider the following true story:
In July 2016, Philando Castile, a black man, was shot and killed in his car by a
Latino police officer in St. Paul, Minnesota, during a traffic stop.19 The officer stated
that Castile looked like someone who was a robbery suspect,20 though he used the
pretext of a broken taillight to pull Castile over. Castile, who was a supervisor of a
local school cafeteria,21 was driving home with his girlfriend and her four-year-old
daughter after buying groceries. After Castile volunteered that he had a gun in the
car, the officer shot him, reportedly because he feared that Castile was reaching for
it and because he smelled marijuana in the car.22 Castile’s girlfriend insisted that
Castile was reaching for his identification, which the officer had requested moments
before he shot him.23
This is the narrative that surfaces in several online searches about Castile’s death.
But it misses an important piece of the story. Between July 2002 and July 2016,
Castile was stopped by the police at least forty-six times—only six of which were

15. Id.
16. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
17. 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
18. The idea of ordinariness explored in this Essay originated in an opinion piece that I
wrote for the New York Times. See Elise C. Boddie, Philando Castile and the Terror of an
Ordinary Day, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/opinion
/philando-castile-and-the-terror-of-an-ordinary-day.html [https://perma.cc/7W38-N9YF].
19. John Bowden, Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Found Not Guilty, HILL
(June 16, 2017, 4:29 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/338193-police-officer-whoshot-philando-castile-found-not-guilty-report [https://perma.cc/UCB3-YVAA].
20. Mark Berman, What the Police Officer Who Shot Philando Castile Said About the
Shooting, WASH. POST (June 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation
/wp/2017/06/21/what-the-police-officer-who-shot-philando-castile-said-about-the-shooting
[https://perma.cc/NE9Q-ZV29].
21. Melissa Chan, Philando Castile Was a Role Model to Hundreds of Kids, Colleagues
Say, TIME (July 7, 2016), http://time.com/4397086/minnesota-shooting-philando-castile-rolemodel-school [https://perma.cc/7DXU-K2R3].
22. Berman, supra note 20.
23. Id.
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for offenses that an officer could have observed prior to the stop.24 As a result, Castile
reportedly accumulated $6000 in fines and tickets, which he struggled to pay.25
Could these repeated interactions with the police have stigmatized Castile?
Stigma refers to what R.A. Lenhardt has described as the state of being “a disfavored
or dishonored individual in the eyes of society.”26 Stigma imposes a “virtual social
identity”27 that shrouds its subjects in racial abstractions and preconceived social
judgments. Because stigma prevents persons from participating in society on fully
equal terms, it is a significant barrier to ordinariness. When stigma is internalized, it
corrupts one’s sense of self.28 W.E.B. Du Bois famously framed this as a struggle
that “yields [black persons] no true self-consciousness, but only lets [them see themselves] through the revelation of the other world.”29 As a result of this “twoness,”
one is “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.”30 Thus, racially stigmatized persons are not only externally diminished by social judgments but
also become agents of their own debasement.31
To unpack this point let us consider how Castile’s experience of being stopped
forty-six times could have burdened his daily experiences of driving to work, driving
home, and while running errands, as he was doing the day he was killed. Did the
possibility of being pulled over occupy his thoughts as he was driving? Did he plan
how he would respond—what he would say and how he would act if the police
stopped him again? Did he ever feel demeaned or humiliated by the police in prior
stops? And, if so, did the sight of a police car make him anxious or fearful?
I ask these questions to illustrate that what many take for granted—the casual,
mundane experience of driving—for Castile may have been a source of daily trauma
that corroded his dignity and freedom. His repeated prior interactions with the police
may have led him to internalize the experiences of being a perpetual suspect.32 This

24. Eyder Peralta & Cheryl Corley, The Driving Life and Death of Philando Castile, NPR
(July 15, 2016, 4:51 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/07/15/485835272
/the-driving-life-and-death-of-philando-castile [https://perma.cc/V3XL-A566] (observing
that of the forty-six stops, “only six of them were things a police officer would notice from
outside a car—things like speeding or having a broken muffler”).
25. Id. These facts suggest that Castile was subject to multiple predatory systems—often
facilitated by constitutional law— that trap poor people of color. See Devon W. Carbado, From
Stopping Black People to Killing Black People: The Fourth Amendment Pathways to Police
Violence, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 129 (2017) [hereinafter Carbado, From Stopping Black
People]; see also Paul Butler, The White Fourth Amendment, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245
(2010); Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002)
[hereinafter Carbado, (E)racing].
26. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 809.
27. E.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
2 (1963).
28. See Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 841–42 (fully exploring this dynamic).
29. W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (1994).
30. Id.
31. Lenhardt, supra note 2, at 818 n.55 (“The idea that one’s racial group ‘is, in fact, less
worthwhile, deserving, or valuable than other social groups or collective identities’ leads to
the inexorable conclusion that one’s personal identity may be similarly flawed.”).
32. See Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 966 (describing the burdens associated with
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might explain why on that day he volunteered to the officer that he had a gun, leading
the officer (who stated that he thought Castile was reaching for it) in turn to shoot
him. In listening to his interactions with the officer on the dashcam video,33 it appears
that Castile was trying to avoid surprising the officer and calmly to reassure him that
he was not only complying with but submitting to the officer’s authority.34 This purposeful demeanor may have reflected lessons that he had learned in his earlier encounters with the police.
These final moments of Castile’s life demonstrate the troubling possibilities of
stigma. The shadow identity that stigma imposes is costly to dignity, but in the context of interactions with the police it can be the difference between life and death.35
The officer sought to justify the shooting by claiming that Castile was reaching for
his gun. Seconds before, however, the officer had asked Castile to produce his license.36 Would the officer have made the decision to fire shots into the car at close
range within a matter of seconds had Castile been white?37 Or would he have given
a white man the benefit of the doubt that he was reaching for his license, rather than
for a weapon? This is the power and tragedy of stigma. It leaves no margin for error
in interactions with the police, but it also inevitably shades those very interactions
with mutual fear and suspicion. In Castile’s case the harms are compounded: the
loss of daily freedom he may have experienced in the years before his death and the
final injustice of his death itself.
I offer Castile’s story as an example of the denial of ordinariness. His story shows
how everyday actions, such as driving down a street, can without warning imperil
the dignity, or even the lives, of black people. Though they may unfold in an instant

racialized suspicion, including “internalized racial obedience toward, and fear of, the police”
and the performance). Carbado writes that
[P]eople of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of performances
for the police. They work their identities in response to, and in an attempt to
preempt, law enforcement discipline. This identity work takes place in a social
atmosphere of fear and loathing. It is intended to signal acquiescence and respectability.
Id. (emphasis in original).
33. In the dashcam video of the incident, Castile can be heard to say calmly, “I do have
to tell you I do have a firearm on me.” Newsy, Dashcam Video of Castile Released, YOUTUBE
(June 20, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mLGRv8bWDks [https://perma.cc
/8BTM-S8M6].
34. See Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 946.
35. This problem is so pervasive that New Jersey legislators have proposed legislation to
require schools to advise schoolchildren on how to interact with the police. Jacqueline L. Urgo,
Black Lives Balks as NJ Lawmaker Wants To Legislate ‘The Talk,’ PHILA. INQUIRER (July 3,
2017, 5:28 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/new_jersey/black-lives-balks-as-n-jlawmaker-wants-to-legislate-the-talk-20170703.html [https://perma.cc/Z272-P448].
36. Jay Croft, Philando Castile Shooting: Dashcam Video Shows Rapid Event, CNN
(June 21, 2017, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/20/us/philando-castile-shootingdashcam/index.html [https://perma.cc/5XDG-CPY4].
37. See Kelly McEvers, Video Captures Police Encounter with Murder Suspect, NPR
(Mar. 23, 2017, 4:41 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/03/23/521274629/video-captures-policeencounter-with-murder-suspect [https://perma.cc/S82U-DAAS] (describing encounter between a white cop and an aggressive white murder suspect that ends with no shots fired).
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these experiences can be deeply debilitating. 38 When they go badly, they jeopardize
ordinariness by producing and reinforcing stigma. There are broader social harms
too, as these experiences are shared with the victim’s friends and family,
“spreading the psychological costs” 39 of the incident and further jeopardizing the
possibilities for developing social trust. Lingering fears and anxieties about the
risk, consistent with history 40 and experience, of being racially demeaned,
harassed, and even endangered at a moment’s notice corrode the sense of self and
social bonds across racial groupings. These fears and anxieties help to explain the
desire for ordinariness: the experience of belonging; of being treated as a
multidimensional person and a rightful subject of human concern; and the
presumption of legitimacy and innocence, conferred on whites often as a matter of
course, that the status of ordinariness entails.
Recall the hopes for ordinariness expressed by blacks following Brown. We can
imagine that the harms of school segregation in the Brown era lay not simply in
the denial of educational opportunity, but also in how it undermined and distorted
interactions across race in the ordinary spaces of classrooms, hallways, and
playgrounds. The promise of integration was that schools would become places
where children would learn to get along (or not) by working through the
practicalities of difference. In these spaces children could disagree and reconcile
their dissimilarities, develop meaningful or casual friendships, or discover that they
really did not like each other at all—not based on race or in spite of race, but in
full view of race.41 The possible benefits of integration lay in allowing students to
experience their shared humanity, to see racial differences as part of that humanity
and to engage through these differences rather than fearing and resenting them.
When students “connect[] through difference and Otherness” 42 across racial lines,
it reduces stigma: “the racial other” passes out of existence and the “two selves”
that Du Bois described become one.
I emphasize the significance of embracing racial difference to make clear that
the demand for ordinariness is not a call for colorblindness or a claim for sameness,

38. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW
PROFESSOR 45 (1992) (Williams describes her experience of being barred from a store by a
white sales clerk: “In the flicker of his judgmental gray eyes, that saleschild had transformed
my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to shambles. He snuffed my
sense of humanitarian catholicity, and there was nothing I could do to snuff his, without
making a spectacle of myself.”).
39. JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS
EXPERIENCE 24 (1994).
40. The experiences of everyday discrimination have a long lineage. Isabel Wilkerson, in
her moving account of the Great Migration, details the daily injustices heaped on black people
as a matter of social custom. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS:
THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010).
41. Cf. Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2009) (“Recognizing how intimate affiliations
affect opportunities and status hierarchies, both in the intimate sphere and beyond, points us
toward new ways to intervene in the persistent problem of discrimination.”).
42. Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán, Personal Reflection on 50 Years of Loving: Creating
Spaces of Differences by Demanding “The Right to Opacity,” 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 637, 638
(2017).
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universality, or assimilation. Equality can be confused with these objectives, 43 but
the logic of ordinariness rejects both. Iris Marion Young observes that seeking
sameness and universalism creates social division, because no group of people is
ever completely similar or completely different. 44 Yet the inability to achieve
complete sameness incentivizes those in the dominant culture to create
“dichotomous hierarchical oppositions” that produce social outsiders by rendering
them “good/bad” and “normal/deviant.” 45 Ordinariness repudiates the goal of
transcending difference. 46 Instead it embraces the “positivity of group
differences”47 and “equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups
who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences.”48
Treating difference as the norm, rather than the exception, allows persons of color
to be understood as complex, multidimensional human beings. 49 It allows them, in
other words, to be ordinary.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL EXAMPLES OF ORDINARINESS
The previous Part discussed the meaning of ordinariness, why it matters as a
measure of racial equality, and how everyday interactions can advance or
undermine it. This Part discusses how ordinariness has manifested itself, either
implicitly or explicitly, in constitutional opinions. It highlights the multiple
pathways that have been taken already by litigants advocating for ordinariness in
constitutional law.
City of Memphis v. Greene50 is a good example. In Greene, black residents challenged the City of Memphis’s decision to close a street that connected an all-white
neighborhood to a predominantly black one 51 due to “undesirable” traffic from the
black neighborhood.52 After conducting a traffic study, the City closed the street
by erecting a physical barrier at precisely the point where the two neighborhoods
came together in addition to deeding a strip of land to residents in the white
community.53 The practical effect of the barrier was to block black pedestrian
traffic into the white neighborhood. 54 The black residents claimed that the barrier
constituted a “badge and incident of slavery” under the Thirteenth Amendment and

43. Cf. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 97 (critiquing ideas of universalism, which obscure the
“positivity of group differences”).
44. Id. at 99.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 163.
47. Id. at 97.
48. Id. at 163.
49. Cf. Elise C. Boddie, Critical Mass and the Paradox of Colorblind Individualism in
Equal Protection, J. CONST. L. 781, 797 (2015) (explaining that “having greater minority representation enhances the likelihood that individual persons of color will focus on their similarities with individual whites, while low representation leads them to dwell more on racial
differences”).
50. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
51. Id. at 102–03.
52. See Elise C. Boddie, Racial Territoriality, 58 UCLA L. REV. 401, 416 (2010).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 417.
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intentional discrimination in violation of equal protection. 55 The Court rejected the
claims.56
In dissent, Justice Marshall focused not only on the practical consequences of the
street closing but also on “the racial identifiability and apparent racial meaning of
the respective neighborhoods” as factors for assessing the plaintiffs’ claims, particularly the white neighborhood’s “history and reputation” as a racially exclusive
community.57 His analysis shows empathy for the stigmatic and dignity harms that
the closure imposed on the black residents:
The majority treats this case as involving nothing more than a dispute
over a city’s race-neutral decision to place a barrier across a road. My
own examination of the record suggests, however, that far more is at
stake here than a simple street closing. The picture that emerges from a
more careful review of the record is one of a white community, disgruntled over sharing its street with Negroes, taking legal measures to keep
out “undesirable traffic,” and of a city, heedless of the harm to its Negro
citizens, acquiescing in the plan.58
Justice Marshall’s language reflects a sensitive understanding of how the street barrier shaped the everyday lives of the City’s black residents and how it demeaned
them by physically segregating their neighborhood from that of the neighboring
white community. In its attentiveness to history and the racial particularities of social
context, Justice Marshall’s dissent illustrates how something so ostensibly ordinary
as a street closure could nonetheless deprive blacks of equality. Thus, Greene is instructive. It illustrates how incidents that some might perceive as unremarkable deny
the benefits of the ordinary and identifies these incidents as a form of racial discrimination.
Two other examples are instructive. In Dandridge v. Williams,59 Justice
Marshall—again in dissent—criticized the Court’s decision to reject an equal protection challenge to a state regulation that capped state allocation of federal public
assistance regardless of family size and actual need.60 Marshall called for a more
practical account of the regulation’s impact on large, poor families61 that would focus
on “the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support
of the classification.”62 His dissent advanced both the letter and spirit of ordinariness
by focusing on the concrete effects and daily impact of the state’s regulation for lowincome people, reminding the Court that public assistance “provides the stuff that
sustains . . . children’s lives: food, clothing, shelter.”63 As in Greene, Justice Marshall

55. Id.
56. Id. at 418.
57. Id. at 419.
58. City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 136 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
60. Id. at 508–30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 520–21.
62. Id. at 521.
63. Id. at 522. For a thorough discussion of Justice Marshall’s focus on the practical consequences of constitutional decision making, see Gay Gellhorn, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
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draws attention to the grittier particularities of inequality and the grinding
indignities of everyday discrimination.
O’Shea v. Littleton64 illustrates another use of ordinariness, this time in framing
constitutional claims. There plaintiffs asserted that they were seeking “equality of
opportunity and treatment in employment, housing, education, participation in
governmental decisionmaking and in ordinary day-to-day relations with white
citizens” and government officials. 65 Although the plaintiffs do not define what
they mean by “ordinary day-to-day relations,” the breadth of their claims points to
the pervasiveness of discrimination and how it encumbered daily life. Equality here
is understood in part as a right to the experience of being unmarked and
unstigmatized in common interactions with fellow citizens.
Ordinariness as an expression of equality has surfaced more recently in cases
involving discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. In Obergefell v.
Hodges,66 Justice Kennedy in his majority opinion invoked ordinariness in
describing the human costs of denying gay couples state recognition of their
marriages:
Leaving the current state of affairs in place would maintain and
promote instability and uncertainty. For some couples, even an
ordinary drive into a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks
causing severe hardship in the event of a spouse’s hospitalization while
across state lines.67
In Romer v. Evans68 Justice Kennedy framed the constitutional harms of
discrimination in ordinariness terms. In Romer, plaintiffs successfully challenged
a state constitutional amendment that denied any form of protection at the local
level against discrimination based on sexual orientation. 69 Justice Kennedy
observes the practical, everyday consequences of the amendment:
These are protections taken for granted by most people either because
they already have them or do not need them; these are protections
against exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society. 70
This description shows how pervasive discrimination resulting from the state
constitutional amendment denied gays the freedom of ordinariness that most
heterosexuals enjoy as a matter of course. By calling attention to the exclusion of
gay people from a “limitless number of transactions and endeavors,” Kennedy
emphasizes the breadth and nuances of daily marginalization in everyday activities
on the basis of sexual orientation.

Jurisprudence of Equal Protection of the Laws and the Poor, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (1994).
64. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
65. Id. at 490–93.
66. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
67. Id. at 2607.
68. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
69. Id. at 631.
70. Id.
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Each of these examples illustrates the possibilities that ordinariness could more
meaningfully play in constitutional law. They elevate the practical consequences of
daily discrimination in common social interactions through empathetic reasoning and
a sensitive appreciation of social context. Obergefell and Romer in particular show
that the demand for ordinariness occupies constitutional terrain outside of racial
discrimination.
As this Part has suggested, there are multiple potential constitutional pathways to
ordinariness. Equal protection is an obvious source, as are other constitutional provisions. Part III focuses on the Fourth Amendment as a specific barrier to ordinariness.71 However, the goals of ordinariness are not just limited to doctrine or courts.
Rather, we can deploy all sorts of constitutional actors—by which I mean people
who are simply invested in making meaning of the Constitution72—in advancing
ordinariness for socially marginalized groups. Part III briefly discusses one such possibility.
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIER TO ORDINARINESS
One of the most consequential barriers to ordinariness lies in the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. As Devon Carbado observes, the Fourth
Amendment plays a prominent role in racial subordination through a litany of cases
that enable police to stop, frisk, question, search, chase, and arrest black people.73
The entire infrastructure of Fourth Amendment doctrine “facilitates the space between stopping black people and killing black people”74 in ways that affect all manner of ordinary activities. The killing of Philando Castile, discussed earlier in this
Essay,75 makes this painfully clear.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Whren v. United States76 is a key part of this
constitutional infrastructure. In Whren, the Court concluded that police officers did
not violate the Fourth Amendment when they used a pretextual traffic stop to search
for drugs without probable cause or reasonable suspicion that drugs were in the car.77
A full description of the events that preceded the stop and the stop itself help to illustrate how Whren denies ordinariness:
On the evening of June 10, 1993, plainclothes vice-squad officers of the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department were patrolling a
“high drug area” of the city in an unmarked car. Their suspicions were

71. See Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 25, at 129.
72. Id.; see also R.A. Lenhardt, Race Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527 (2011); Reva B.
Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The
Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1325 (2006) (describing a form of “constitutional culture [that] shapes both popular and professional claims about the Constitution and
enables the forms of communication and deliberative engagement among citizens and officials
that dynamically sustain the Constitution’s democratic authority in history”).
73. See Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 25, at 129; Butler, supra note
25, at 245; Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 966.
74. Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 25, at 125.
75. See infra Part I.
76. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
77. Id. at 819.
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aroused when they passed a dark Pathfinder truck with temporary license
plates and youthful occupants waiting at a stop sign, the driver looking
down into the lap of the passenger at his right. The truck remained
stopped at the intersection for what seemed an unusually long time
—more than 20 seconds. When the police car executed a U-turn in order
to head back toward the truck, the Pathfinder turned suddenly to his right,
without signaling, and sped off at an “unreasonable” speed. The policemen followed, and in a short while overtook the Pathfinder when it
stopped behind other traffic at a red light. They pulled up alongside, and
[one of the officers] stepped out and approached the driver’s door, identifying himself as a police officer and directing the driver . . . to put the
vehicle in park. When [the officer] drew up to the driver’s window, he
immediately observed two large plastic bags of what appeared to be
crack cocaine in petitioner Whren’s hands. Petitioners were arrested, and
quantities of several types of illegal drugs were retrieved from the
vehicle.78
Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence on grounds that the stop that led to the
seizure of the drugs was unconstitutional.79 They argued that the officers lacked a
“constitutionally adequate” basis to stop the car and search for drugs and that the
officer’s asserted basis for approaching the car—to warn them about the traffic violation—was pretextual.80
Before Whren, the courts of appeals split on the standard for evaluating the use of
pretextual traffic stops where officers otherwise lacked probable cause. The standard
adopted by two other circuits called for courts to evaluate whether “a reasonable
police officer ‘would have’ conducted the search under similar circumstances.”81 On
the particular facts of Whren, this standard would have required the court to determine whether a reasonable officer would have bothered to stop a car solely for
turning without signaling and speeding off. The answer to that question likely would
have been no. Most police officers probably have better things to do.
Petitioners pressed the Court to adopt the “reasonable officer” standard on
grounds that it was more protective of civilians.82 They observed that “total compliance with traffic and safety rules [was] nearly impossible” because “the use of automobiles is so heavily and minutely regulated.”83 Consider some examples of traffic
safety violations: “driving too slowly,” driving too closely, using a “loud or unnecessary horn,” and driving at a speed that is greater than what is “reasonable and

78. Id. at 808–09.
79. See id. at 809.
80. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (No. 95-5841), 1996 WL 75760, at *2 (“In denying defendants’ motion
to suppress, both the district court and the court of appeals acknowledged that the police lacked
any constitutionally adequate suspicion to stop the car and search for drugs. And neither court
quarreled with defendants’ assertion that the alleged traffic violations were only a pretext to
conduct a drug search for which there was no other colorable constitutional basis.”).
81. Id.
82. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
83. Id.
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prudent.”84 As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) observed in its amicus
brief in support of the petitioners, “[w]hether intentionally or not, virtually everyone
violates the traffic laws at one point or another.”85 Thus, a standard that allowed
officers to make pretextual traffic stops would eviscerate the protections of the
Fourth Amendment, because an officer could “invariably . . . catch any motorist in a
technical violation.”86
There was another obvious problem. A decision that validated the pretextual use
of traffic stops, petitioners warned, would exacerbate the problem87 of racial profiling.88 Although Whren would apply to any motorist, the brunt of an adverse ruling
would be borne by blacks and other racially marginalized groups.89
This prediction proved to be accurate. In the years since Whren, racial profiling
has continued to be a persistent problem, but with very little constitutional recourse.
A New York Times analysis of “tens of thousands of traffic stops and years of arrest
data” in Greensboro, North Carolina, for example, “uncovered wide racial differences in measure after measure of police conduct.”90 Blacks were pulled over for
traffic violations “at a rate far out of proportion with their share of the local driving
population.”91 The analysis also revealed that officers “used their discretion to search
black drivers or their cars more than twice as often as white motorists
—even though they found drugs and weapons significantly more often when the
driver was white.”92 The same pattern occurred across the rest of the state and in
other jurisdictions across the country.93 The human consequences of these stops are
significant. For example, blacks have been killed by police after being “pulled over
for minor traffic infractions: a broken brake light, a missing front license plate, and
failure to signal a lane change.”94
Return to the facts of Whren. Just what was it about the “youthful occupants”
driving a car with temporary plates who had stopped at an intersection for “more than
20 seconds,” with the driver looking down at the lap of the passenger that “aroused

84. See Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 25, at 154; see also Butler,
supra note 25, at 245; Carbado, (E)racing, supra note 25, at 946.
85. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
supra note 80, at *3.
86. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
87. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the
“New Federalism” in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 375
(2001) (noting petitioners’ argument that such a standard “would give police almost unlimited
discretionary power to stop any driver at any time, and that police would almost certainly use
this power to stop minorities, especially African-Americans, in numbers well out of proportion
to their presence on the road” and “even cited recent statistics from studies in Maryland and
New Jersey that substantiated this very fact”).
88. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
89. Id.
90. See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate Risks of Driving
While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/us/racialdisparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html [https://perma.cc/A7TR-K4X7].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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suspicion”?95 There are a number of possible innocent explanations. Maybe the car
was new (hence the temporary plates). Maybe they stopped longer than necessary at
the stop sign because they were lost. Maybe the driver was looking at the passenger’s
lap because the passenger had a map. Maybe they stopped because they thought they
forgot something.
Or maybe the car’s occupants just “looked suspicious” to the officers because they
were black.96 (Would they have stopped the car if the youth were white and driving
through a white neighborhood?)
The problem with Whren is that it constitutionalizes racialized suspicion of ordinary behavior. It gives police officers license to use minor infractions to justify pretextual stops in ways that target blacks. Under the auspices of supposedly race neutral
police practices, Whren facilitates presumptions of black criminality for otherwise
common conduct. It is an example of the kind of constitutional decision that frustrates the ability of blacks to engage in the kinds of everyday activities and behaviors
that whites typically can do as a matter of course.
The kinds of stops that Whren allows can have lasting effects on one’s self-esteem, sense of safety, and other markers of physical and emotional well-being.
Consider what happened in 2013 to Rufus Scales, a black man, who was pulled over
in Greensboro for minor traffic violations that included expired plates.97 Because
Scales was uncertain whether to get out of the car, he reached over to prevent his
younger brother from opening the passenger door.98 The officer tasered Scales and
dragged him, paralyzed, from the car, giving him a split lip and a chipped tooth.99
Years later his brother would not leave the house without a “hand-held video camera
and a business card with a toll-free number for legal help.”100 If the police approach,
Rufus Scales “instinctively turns away.”101 This encounter may be more severe than
is typical. But the pervasiveness and frequency of police stops, coupled with awareness of their potential deadly consequences, instills a particularly intense fear of the
police among black people.102 That fear conditions a set of responses—running away,
for example—that we should not reflexively presume to be suspicious, evasive behavior.
What can be done to advance ordinariness outside the doctrinal confines of the
Fourth Amendment? We can start with police regulations. The District of Columbia
police officers who instigated the stop in Whren were subject to a departmental regulation prohibiting plainclothes officers or officers in unmarked cars from making
traffic stops unless the traffic violation was “so grave as to pose an immediate threat
to the safety of others.”103 Similar kinds of regulations could limit the kind of citizen-

95. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996).
96. The description of their race surfaced only in connection with their constitutional argument that a lower Fourth Amendment standard would increase the risk that police officers
would make stops based on race. Whren, 517 U.S. at 810.
97. See LaFraniere & Lehren, supra note 90.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Carbado, From Stopping Black People, supra note 25.
103. Brief for American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners,
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police encounters that endanger black lives. We should also limit policies and practices that criminalize black and Latino communities, such as aggressive stop and frisk
policies104 and “broken windows” policing that targets minor street infractions for
enforcement.105
CONCLUSION: PUTTING ORDINARINESS TO WORK THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION
The goal of ordinariness is for people of color to be able to take their place in the
world of the mundane, to be able to do the kinds of things in the course of the
everyday that many whites take for granted. Although this Essay has focused on the
experiences of black people, it has demonstrated that this project could apply to other
socially marginalized groups.106
Some may resist the framework of ordinariness because it is too focused on
everyday social interactions. They might argue that we should concentrate instead
on rights that are more tangible, more textually supported and more immediately
consequential.107 To the extent that the project engages courts, there are also questions about how to construct appropriate decisional rules that would advance ordinariness in constitutional decisions, a subject that I have not explored here.108
The doctrinal limitations are also substantial. A good part of constitutional law
more or less is constitutive of the racial caste system. Equal protection, for example,
has legitimized a superstructure of inequality, limiting the possibilities for ordinary
racial interactions.109 I have already discussed the problems with the Fourth
Amendment, which sustains and reinforces blacks’ perpetual state of otherness.
Thus, there are significant doctrinal headwinds.
Still, these barriers need not deny ordinariness all normative possibilities. As
Lawrence Sager has argued, just because a norm is underenforced does not mean that
it is, or should be regarded as, conceptually invalid.110 Norms can still bind other

supra note 80, at *1–2.
104. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (enjoining stop and
frisk policies and practices).
105. See Jonathan Oberman & Kendea Johnson, Broken Windows: Restoring Social Order
or Damaging and Depleting New York’s Poor Communities of Color?, 37 CARDOZO L. REV.
931 (2016).
106. See infra Part II.
107. As Lawrence Sager has observed, “there is an important distinction between a statement which describes an ideal which is embodied in the Constitution and a statement which
attempts to translate such an ideal into a workable standard for the decision of concrete issues.”
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978).
108. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the
Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1658–67 (2005) (describing the factors that “lead the Court to
adopt a decision rule that varies significantly from the constitutional operative provision”).
109. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007) (striking down voluntary, race-specific policies that sought to limit the impact of residential segregation by promoting integration in public schools).
110. Lawrence Sager argued as such:
[C]onstitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should
be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits . . . By “legally
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governmental actors, such as administrative agencies, legislators, and private citizens.111 Indeed, the benefit of calling for a norm is that it can influence an array of
public and private decisions without having to sort out all the doctrinal particulars.
Thus, the problems are difficult and longstanding. None of these challenges, however, diminish the significance of the demand for ordinariness and the desire just to
be. The hope for ordinariness is integral to the future of the Constitution. Only by
attending to the experiences of the everyday can we make its equality guarantees
meaningful.

valid,” I mean that the unenforced margins of underenforced norms should have
the full status of positive law which we generally accord to the norms of our
Constitution, save only that the federal judiciary will not enforce these margins.
Thus, the legal powers or legal obligations of government officials which are
subtended in the unenforced margins of underenforced constitutional norms are
to be understood to remain in full force.
Sager, supra note 107, at 1221; see also Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA.
L. REV. 801, 811 (2012) (“But even when underenforced by courts, constitutional norms are
binding to their conceptual limit on other actors and retain their full trumping status in and out
of court.”).
111. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality
Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339 (2012).

